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DISCLOSURE AS DISTRIBUTION
Jeremy N. Sheff
Abstract: This brief response to the work of Professors Omri Ben-Shahr and Carl
Schneider on mandated disclosure regimes investigates the normative criteria underlying
their claim that those regimes are failures. Specifically, it unpacks the pieces of those
authors' implicit cost-benefit analysis, revealing inherently normative judgments about desert
and responsibility at the core of their (or any) critique of disclosure regimes. Disclosure
regimes may aim to improve human decisionmaking behaviors, but those behaviors are
influenced in non-deterministic ways by cognitive capacities that are heterogeneously
distributed among subjects of the regimes. Accordingly, any claim regarding the normative
desirability of disclosure regimes (or any other regulatory regime that seeks to channel and
improve decisionmaking) implicitly rests on judgments regarding individuals' responsibility
for their own capacities. I argue that in evaluating such regulatory regimes, focusing on
efficiency through cost-benefit analysis distracts from inescapable and logically prior
distributive questions regarding desert and responsibility.

INTRODUCTION
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider have done legal scholars and
policymakers a tremendous service by collecting, in one place, various
clues and traces of an undeniable truth: that regulatory regimes built on
the compelled disclosure of information are endemic, and can be
problematic. Reviewing their comprehensive research, I find little if
anything to add to their identification of various instances of mandated
disclosure regimes, nor of their analysis of the practical effects of those
regimes-certainly nothing beyond the points already raised by
Professor Craswell in his response to their project. 2 So instead, I would
like to focus on the normative implications of the evidence and analysis
Professors Ben-Shahar, Schneider and Craswell have assembled, an
issue which still calls for further development. Like Professor Craswell,
I will question whether the phenomenon of mandated disclosure-as
documented by Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider-can properly be
Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University. I am grateful to the organizers of the
Washington Law Review Symposium on "The Crisis of Mandated Disclosure," at which I presented
a version of this response, and to Professor Zahr Said for the invitation to do so.
1. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L.

REV. 647 (2011).
2. Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their Success or
Failure, 88 WASH. L. REv. 333, 335-37, 354-59 (2013).
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characterized as a "failure," if only to clarify what we mean when we
use such a pejorative term.
If mandated disclosure has failed, certainly we should be able to say
with confidence what it has failed to do: to what end is mandated
disclosure supposed to serve as a means? But beyond that, we will also
have to defend that end as one worth attaining: some normative
commitment must justify whatever ends the legal regime might serve. So
the purpose of my response is both to expand on Professor Craswell's
efforts to identify possible ends for mandated disclosure regimes, and to
assess the normative commitments underlying those endscommitments on which Craswell, Ben-Shahar and Schneider seem to
agree, if only in their assumptions.
I.

IDENTIFYING NORMATIVE SYSTEMS

In his symposium presentation, Professor Schneider identified two
species of "disclosurites"-proponents of mandated disclosure. The
first species, he explained, appears to be motivated by concerns over
dignity or autonomy. They claim that there is a moral obligation to
respect this principle of autonomy by providing information to
disclosees, regardless of the disclosures' costs, or of their actual effects
on the disclosees' decisionmaking.5 But assuming Professor Schneider's
characterization of this species of disclosurite is accurate, as far as they
are concerned one cannot characterize mandated disclosure as a failure
at all. To the contrary, it accomplishes precisely what it should-it
satisfies disclosers' moral obligations to respect disclosees' autonomy.
So with respect to the autonomy-based argument in favor of
disclosure, Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider are not really proving a
failure, nor do I believe they claim to. Instead, they simply have a
normative disagreement with some proponents of mandated disclosure,
and have not attempted to justify their own normative framework as
superior to the alternative espoused by those proponents. Specifically,
they differ with autonomy-focused disclosurites as to the moral
implications of disclosure and the appropriate scope, content, or value of
autonomy or dignity in public policy-though they don't really join the

3. Id at 1-2.
4. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 681 (outlining "free-market" and "autonomy"
principles underlying disclosure mandates); see also Craswell, supranote 2, at 339.
5. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 681 ("[M]andated disclosure serves the
autonomy principle. It supposes that people make better decisions for themselves than anyone can
make for them and that people are entitled to freedom in making decisions.").
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normative argument over what that scope, content, or value ought to be.
Nor, for that matter, does Professor Craswell, who concedes that such a
critique is outside his area of expertise. 6 The bare fact of this normative
disagreement is nevertheless important, because it demonstrates that a
plausible set of normative criteria exist under which mandated disclosure
is not a failure, but a success. This being the case, the characterization of
mandated disclosure as a failure requires some defense of an alternative
set of normative criteria as superior. And as I intend to argue, the
normative criteria Professors Ben-Shahar, Schneider, and Craswell
appear to adopt have more in common with the autonomy-based
framework than they seem to realize.
The other class of disclosurites Professor Schneider identified in his
remarks appear to be working within a normative framework that
Professors Ben-Shahar, Schneider, and Craswell all support. We can
glean traces of this framework from Professors Ben-Shahar's and
Schneider's Article. They note that policymakers and legislators
frequently mandate disclosure as a solution to various perceived "'social
problems,"' and that these social problems are often illusory
extrapolations of "'individual acts of malfeasance."' 7 They assert that
disclosure is a policy measure that "aspires to improve decisions people
make in their economic and social relationships and particularly to
protect the nafve from the sophisticated." 8 And they note that the tool for
achieving this aspiration is "requiring the revelation of information." 9 So
we have some hints at the ends that Professors Ben-Shahar and
Schneider think mandated disclosure ought to pursue: protecting nayfs
from harm caused by the decisions they make when interacting with
sophisticates who might benefit from those same decisions. The means
to that end-the "revelation of information" to the naffs-is, they
maintain, supposed to "improve decisions" made by those naffs,
presumably so as to avert the harms they would otherwise suffer.10
6. Craswell, supra note 2, at 339.
7. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 1, at 680 (quoting EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A.
KAGAN,

GOING BY

THE BOOK:

THE

PROBLEM
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REGULATORY

UNREASONABLENESS

23

(Transaction Publishers 2d prtg. 2003) (1982)).
8. Id. at 649.
9. Id. at 720.
10. The standard by which a decision may be deemed "improved" is nowhere explicitly stated,
though Professor Craswell offers a plausible metric for the consumer protection context: the extent
to which a disclosure (d) changes consumer beliefs regarding a product's quality (r) to be more
consistent with some presumably objective measure of that same quality (s), leading consumers to
purchase the optimal number of those products given the risk of loss represented by s. Craswell,
supranote 2, at 381-83.
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However, Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider further hold that
these benefits to nalfs cannot in themselves justify disclosure. "Whatever
benefits mandated disclosures may offer," they say, "mandates are
unjustifiable if their costs outweigh their benefits."" This, then, appears
to be a normative claim grounded in cost-benefit analysis, a staple tool
of consequentialist normative systems such as the welfarism typical of
the economic analysis of law.' 2 Professor Craswell-no stranger to this
mode of thinking-goes so far as to explicitly adopt such cost-benefit
analysis as his normative criterion for assessing the justifiability of
disclosure mandates and alternative consumer protection regimes.13 So
all three authors would appear to be willing to defend (or assume)
something like a welfarist normative framework as superior to the
autonomy-based framework they all seem to dismiss. As such, they
would have us quantify both the benefits and the costs of disclosure, and
then net them against each other. Importantly, these are two separate
steps, and the separation between them complicates the normative
framework Ben-Shahar, Schneider, and Craswell would have us adopt.
II.

CAUSATION, COSTS, AND BENEFITS

Assuming that a welfarist framework applied through cost-benefit
analysis is in fact the most defensible one, how might it lead to a
conclusion that mandated disclosure fails? Presumably a legal regime
will "fail" cost-benefit analysis if it leads to benefits that are too small
relative to its costs, which are relatively too large, all measured against
some relevant baseline. And on the benefit side, Professors Ben-Shahar
and Schneider have assembled an impressive array of evidence and
analysis that ought to convince us that mandated disclosure very often
fails to completely achieve ends they have set for it-the avoidance of
harms to nalfs through the improvement of the naffs' decisionmaking.
But the absence of total success is not the same thing as failure. As
Professor Craswell points out, there may be other "dynamic" benefits to
disclosure-such as providing sophisticates incentives to alter their

11. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supranote 1, at 735.
12. See Amartya Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHILOS. 463, 468 (1979) (defining the
moral criterion of welfarism as "[t]he judgment of the relative goodness of alternative states of
affairs must be based exclusively on, and taken as an increasing function of, the respective
collections of individual utilities in these states"); see generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) (a description and defense of a welfarist
approach to legal policy from two prominent figures in the economic analysis of law).
13. Craswell, supranote 2, at 349-50.

2013]

DISCLOSURE AS DISTRIBUTION

479

behavior vis-a-vis nafs' 4-which
Ben-Shahar and Schneider
5
systematically ignore.' Moreover, even the "static" benefit of improved
decisionmaking appears to be more common than one might conclude
after reading Ben-Shahar's and Schneider's Article.16 And indeed, they
concede that mandated disclosure does not always generate zero
benefits-that in fact sometimes it does achieve the goal of improving
disclosees' decisionmaking, at least partially. For example, in contexts
where at least some disclosees are themselves relatively sophisticated,
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider concede that disclosure can
"produce[] a desirable effect" not only for these sophisticated disclosees
but for naffs as well. These contexts-securities markets, hospital
disclosures to insurers, and environmental disclosures to government
agencies-arise when the responses of sophisticated disclosees have
positive spillover effects for less sophisticated disclosees, increasing the
magnitude of mandated disclosure's aggregate benefits. 7 So the
allegation of failure at least excludes these contexts, which Ben-Shahar
and Schneider claim are "few and far between." 18
In other contexts, however, the failure alleged seems to lie not in the
absence or rarity of improved disclosee decisionmaking, but in the
identity of disclosees whose decisionmaking is improved. Here,
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider claim that mandated disclosure
generates "inequity" by benefiting more sophisticated disclosees but not
more nalve ones-it helps those who least need it, they say. 19 Perhaps
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider intend this argument to establish
that the magnitude of a disclosure's benefits is relatively small, but the
use of the term "inequity" implies some type of distributive criteria that I
will explore further below. 20 And of course, embedded in even this
argument against mandated disclosure is an admission that cuts against
the overall claim of failure: disclosure does in fact improve the
decisionmaking of at least some (relatively more sophisticated)
-21
disclosees.
So if mandated disclosure is "failing" despite at least partial
achievement of the goals Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider have set
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 354-72.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 335 & nn.4-5.
Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supranote 1, at 732.
Id.
Id. at 740-42.
See infra Parts III-IV.
Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supranote 1, at 740.
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for it, we face one of two possibilities. The first is that the accusation of
failure rests on a view that the perfect is the enemy of the good-that
anything short of total success is rightly considered a failure.22 I do not
understand them to be making this argument. Instead, I believe they are
arguing the second possibility: that whatever successes mandated
disclosure has in achieving the goals set for it are outweighed by other
undesirable features of mandated disclosure regimes-their costs. If we
are to accept this claim, we must identify these undesirable features,
assess what makes them undesirable, and understand how we are to
weigh them against mandated disclosure's admitted successes.
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider extensively document the
significant pecuniary and other burdens disclosure mandates impose on
disclosers-even well-meaning ones-as well as on policymakers
charged with implementing the regimes. 23 But these costs, by
assumption, ultimately flow from an attempt to influence disclosees'
behavior-to improve their decisions. And it is precisely the complexity
of human cognition and decision-making behaviors that renders
formulation of and compliance with disclosure mandates so costly to
those who engage in it.
Figuring out how to provide information that will improve disclosees'
decisionmaking, and then providing that information in useful ways, is
exceedingly and perhaps impossibly difficult. This is so because
disclosees' inherent capacity to improve their decisionmaking by
incorporating new information is sharply limited. Ben-Shahar and
Schneider ably review relevant limits on disclosee capacity, framing
them on the one hand as costs of disclosure regimes to disclosees
themselves in time, attention, and effort, and on the other hand as
obstacles to realizing benefits from disclosures such as limited cognitive
capacity and forms of cognitive bias.24
But these features of disclosee decisionmaking are not really
"costs"-that is, results-of mandated disclosure regimes; they are the
root cause of any alleged disparity between costs and benefits. If the
benefits of disclosure are low it is because many disclosees lack the
capacity to realize those benefits; if the costs are high it is because
inherent limits on disclosee capacity make it difficult to attain the end
we have set for mandated disclosure-the improvement of disclosee
decisions. In short, the source of mandated disclosure's "failure"-if
22. See also Craswell, supra note 2, at 338 ("Set the bar for success high enough, and every
disclosure is a failure.").
23. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supranote 1, at 679-704.
24. Id. at 704-29.
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indeed the allegation of failure rests on an assertion that disclosures'
costs exceed their benefits to sophisticated disclosees-lies in the nature
of disclosee decisionmaking itself.
III.

CUIBONO?

Putting disclosee decisionmaking at the center of the problem of
mandated disclosure complicates not only Professors Ben-Shahar's and
Schneider's critique, but also Professor Craswell's efforts to partially
rebut that critique. This is because the messiness of disclosee
decisionmaking necessarily displaces the fundamental normative
principle underlying their analyses-welfare-maximization-with other,
less quantifiable normative principles that ultimately collapse into the
autonomy principle all three authors attempt to elide. It forces us to
choose winners and losers not by reference to costs, but by reference to
judgments about moral responsibility for our own cognitive capacities.
To understand why, we can begin with Professor Craswell's effort to
formalize what we mean by "improved" decisionmaking-an effort
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider never take up. Improvement-in
Professor Craswell's view-lies in the correction of decision-makers'
erroneous beliefs. Thus, where a product quality has an objective value
s, a disclosure will improve disclosees' decisionmaking if it moves their
own subjective assessment of that value, r, closer to s than it would have
been absent the disclosure.25
This framing of the criterion of improvement is problematic for two
reasons. First, it assumes that r deterministically affects a consumer's
decision to purchase a product. 26 And second, it treats all consumers as if
both their assessments of r and the function according to which they
translate r into a purchasing decision are the same.2 Professor
Craswell's model requires these assumptions to be mathematically
tractable, and such assumptions are exceedingly common in the
economic analysis of law. But when analyzing a legal regime whose key
feature is the limits of human cognition and decisionmaking, these types
of assumptions obscure far more than they clarify.
This is because both assumptions are demonstrably false, as

25. Craswell, supranote 2, at 340-42.
26. Id. at 381 (assuming that where consumers know the actual value of s, they "respond to
sellers' choices by choosing the quantity they purchase"); id. at 382-84 (adding the complication of
a divergence between consumers' subjective estimate of s and its true value).
27. Id. at 381 (assuming for purposes of the model that all consumers are the same in all
respects).
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Professors Ben-Shahar's and Schneider's analysis-particularly their
discussion of inequity 28 -SUfficeS to demonstrate. This might not be a
grievous fault if the assumptions had a trivial effect on the outcome of
the analysis-if they provided a good enough approximation of actual
behavior to generate useful results.29 But not only are the assumptions
false, they are false in a way that can make a qualitative difference in our
assessments of the costs and benefits of a legal regime that purports to
influence human decisionmaking.
Divergences from the rational decision-making behavior Professor
Craswell's model assumes are common, but heterogeneously distributed.
In particular, cognitive biases and other cognitive limitations are not
equally exhibited across persons, nor even by the same person across
time and situations. 30 They are probabilistic rather than deterministicdistribution curves rather than linear relationships or binary switchesand they are subject to change with iteration. 3 1 This does not simply
make it difficult to determine the magnitude of any increase in welfare
attributable to an improvement in disclosee decisionmaking, it also
means that the magnitude and even the sign of the aggregate effect of a
disclosure on disclosees' decisions (and thus their welfare) depends
heavily on the distribution of cognitive capacities in the population of
disclosees and across time.
Turning again to Professor Craswell's model, imagine that r is not a
theoretically ideal disclosee's estimate of s but rather a parameter
representing the estimate of each actual disclosee. Suppose further that
there are two classes of disclosees: naffs and sophisticates. For the
sophisticates, a particular disclosure may move r closer to s, while for
the naffs a disclosure actually moves r farther from s, though within each
class the degree of this effect may vary around the class mean. In this
28. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supranote 1, at 740-42.
29. Richard A. Epstein, Second-Order Rationality, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 355, 357

(Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006).
30. See generally Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Peifect RationalityShould Not Be
Tradedfor BehavioralLawmand Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002).
31. For example, learning from one's own mistakes, or those of other disclosees, could
theoretically make mandated disclosures more effective over time. Cf Richard A. Epstein,
BehavioralEconomics: Human Errors and Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 113-15
(2006). Indeed, there is at least some evidence that they do. Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical
Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803, 811-13 (2008) (citing Sumit Agarwal et
al., The Age of Reason: FinancialDecisions over the Lifecycle (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep't of Econ.
Working
Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
07-11,
2007),
available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-973790). However, there is also evidence that sometimes individuals show
considerable resistance to learning, as I have previously discussed in the consumer context. Jeremy
N. Sheff, BiasingBrands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 1284-95 (2011).
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case, the aggregate effect of disclosure just on disclosees themselves

would depend significantly on the relative size of each class of disclosee
and the discrete effect of the disclosure on each class-that is, on the
distribution of cognitive capacities.
There is certainly reason to believe that this hypothetical is a more
accurate description of actual human cognition than Professor Craswell's
mathematical model. Indeed, in Professor Craswell's response, he notes
a study that shows that disclosures of information appear to increase the
accuracy of some disclosee beliefs even as they appear to decrease the
accuracy of other, related beliefs. 32 The study does not reveal whether
the same disclosees experienced these different effects, or rather whether
some disclosees' experienced a pure benefit or a pure harm from the
disclosure in terms of the accuracy of their beliefs. And of course, for
many disclosees there was likely no effect at all. 34 Similarly, some
studies appear to show that disclosures merely exaggerate preexisting
differences in the quality of decisions that members of the disclosee
population make. For example, the effects of a disclosure that the claims
in advertisements for a nutritional supplement "have not been evaluated
by the [FDA]"3 appear to be somewhat correlated to education levels.36
Holding these constant, such a disclosure appears to have no effect on
disclosees' belief in the veracity of an advertisement's health claims,
which are more likely to be believed by those with a higher background
trust in government or a higher belief in the efficacy of nutritional
supplements generally.3 7
The interaction between the distribution of cognitive capacities and
the distribution of costs and benefits of mandated disclosure regimes
greatly complicates the task of normatively justifying those regimes,
even before we come to the point of netting disclosure's effect on
disclosees against the costs of disclosure to others. In the first instance, it
means the welfarist must jettison Paretian criteria ofjustification in favor
38
of something more like Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Once we do this, we
32. Craswell, supranote 2, at 348-50 (citing Cornelia Pechmann, Do Consumers Overgeneralize
One-Sided Comparative Price Claims, and Are More StringentRegulations Needed?, 33 J. MARKET
RES. 150 (1996)).
33. Pechmann, supra note 33, at 157-58, 158 tbl.3.
34. See id.
35. 21 C.F.R. § 101.93(c)(2) (2012).
36. See Karen Russo France & Paula Fitzgerald Bone, Policy Makers' Paradigmsand Evidence
ftom Consumer InterpretationsofDietary Supplement Labels, 39 J. CONSUMER AFF. 27, 35-37, 46
(2005).
37. Id
38. Lewis Kornhauser, The Economic Analysis of Lawu', in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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are faced with the task of trying to reduce the potentially
incommensurate values held by admittedly heterogeneous subjects of the
legal regime to a single cardinal metric. In doing so, we must of
necessity make normative judgments regarding the appropriate weight to
be given to the subjective values held by particular subjects or classes of
subjects of the regime in question-judgments with which at least some
holders of those subjective beliefs are likely to disagree. 39 Finally,
adding in the costs to policymakers and disclosers requires these
normatively fraught exercises to be repeated all over again.
As I noted above,40 cost-benefit analysis entails two steps: assigning
valuations and then summing them. Valuation necessarily precedes
aggregation, and it is an inescapably normative and indeed distributive
exercise. Professor Craswell seems to recognize this facet of cost-benefit
analysis as a genuine theoretical difficulty, 41 whereas Professors BenShahar and Schneider seem to be content to use it as simply more
ammunition against disclosure mandates.42 But the fact remains that
some disclosees will very likely benefit from whatever disclosure is
mandated; like their disclosers they can now be considered sophisticated,
as contrasted with the naffs who fall on the wrong side of the cognitive
distribution and do not benefit from (or are injured by) the disclosure in
question.
Indeed, all disclosure mandates impose some costs on one or more
segments of society. We are operating under the assumption that they do
so in order to shift some other segment from the category of naffs to the
category of sophisticates-from those who make what we would
consider "bad" decisions to those who make what we would consider
"good" (or at least "better") decisions. And so in setting and
implementing such a mandate, policymakers and disclosers are
inevitably-even if unintentionally-choosing a point on the continuum

PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall201 I/entries/legaleconanalysis/ (identifying cost-benefit analysis with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency); Richard A. Posner,
Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification,and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1153 (2000) (same).
39. Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law, & Economics, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 815, 833-35 (1990).

40. See supranote 13 and accompanying text.
41. Craswell, supra note 2, at 350 ("[H]ow we value any improvement (or any decline) in the
accuracy of consumers' beliefs is a question that cannot be answered by mathematical calculations.
Instead, it requires a fundamental value judgment about the importance of a better- or worseinformed citizenry compared to the value of other uses to which the money might otherwise have
been put. Cost-benefit analysis is a useful way to highlight the importance of these value questions,
but it does not always provide an uncontroversial way of answering them.").
42. See supranote 19 and accompanying text.
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of capacities at which the nalfs will be separated from the sophisticates.
When we ask whether the benefits to those disclosees justify the costs,
then, we are inevitably asking whether we have drawn this line in the
right place. But where a legal regime performs such a sorting function
based on capacities rather than preferences, cost-benefit analysis of the
regime ceases to be an optimization exercise and takes on more nakedly
normative and distributive dimensions.
IV. COGNITIVE DIFFERENCES AND POSITIONAL
PREFERENCES
We cannot decide where to draw the line between naffs and
sophisticates without taking a position on debatable normative questions
that are independent of any concern for efficiency. For example,
consider that for many individuals, positional preferences may be a
stronger determinant of subjective welfare than absolute preferences.43
Any cost-benefit analysis-i.e., any judgment concerning a policy
choice's efficiency-must therefore inevitably decide how to weigh, for
example, the absolute preferences of those in a relatively better position
against the positional preferences of those in a relatively worse
position.4 4 Professor Hovenkamp helpfully illustrates the point:
Is there much doubt, for example, that a woman's sense of
well-being may be affected not merely by her absolute earnings,
but also by whether she earns the same amount as a male
performing the same work? That a black school child's sense of
well-being depends not merely on the absolute quality of his
educational opportunities, but also on how those opportunities
compare with those of white children? That taxpayers are
concerned not merely with the absolute amount they must pay,
but also with their relative burden compared to others? 45
As a society we have taken a normative stance on these types of
positional preferences, particularly those grounded in, for example,
gender and race. But that normative stance seems to have little to do
with a cardinalized comparison of the positional and absolute
preferences of those subject to our legal regimes and more to do with
43. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757
(2009); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Absolute Preferences and Relative Preferences in Property Law,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 2157 (2012).
44. See Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
913, 921 27 (2000) (discussing the challenge of measuring positional preferences and incorporating
them into cost-benefit analysis).
45. Hovenkamp, supranote 39, at 837 (footnote omitted).

486

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:475

moral claims regarding the appropriate bases for distributional
differences-claims typically grounded in understandings of dignity,
moral agency, and desert.
To these familiar examples of social inequality we may now add the
relatively novel dimension of cognitive inequality, and see whether it
invokes similar normative commitments regarding distribution. When
attempting to calculate the social utility that a mandated disclosure
generates as part of some cost-benefit analysis, we will inevitably have
to answer uncomfortable questions. Specifically, we must discuss
whether and how we ought to weigh the negative utility that naffs
realize-by virtue of being in an inferior position relative to
sophisticates-against the absolute losses to the sophisticates that would
attend any effort to improve the naffs' relative position through law.
Given the examples of mandated disclosure regimes discussed by
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider, we can thus add to Professor
Hovenkamp's list the credit-worthy borrower who realizes she got a
more expensive mortgage than her equally credit-worthy neighbor,4 6 the
cable television consumer who discovers he is barred from joining the
class action begun by another customer of the same cable company, 417
and the patient who died of a disease others avoided by undergoing a
screening procedure she mistakenly believed to be unduly risky.48 One
question we might ask ourselves is whether these examples trigger the
same moral intuitions as the examples offered by Professor Hovenkamp.
The answer to that question is not so clear, which is in itself
interesting. We may very well be more willing to impose costs on, for
example, the less careful and capable reader compared to the more
careful and capable one by virtue of his lack of care and capacity than

we are on, say, the female employee over the male one by virtue of her
gender, or the black school child over the white one by virtue of his race.
And this points to a feature of mandated disclosure regimes that
49
Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider discuss only in passing
mandated disclosure can have the effect of apportioning moral
responsibility for the injuries that befall the vulnerable onto the injured

46. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supranote 1, at 665-67.
47. Id. at 741.
48. Id. at 667-70; cf id. at 682.
49. Id. at 746 ("The ideological thrust of mandated disclosure-its origins in both market and
autonomy theory-is to place choice, and thus risk and responsibility, onto the ill-informed and inexpert person facing a novel and complex decision. That can have especially lamentable
consequences for the vulnerable, but it also leaves ordinary people facing decisions ill-prepared and
ill-equipped.").
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themselves. Given that the enactment and tailoring of a disclosure
regime inevitably involve deciding where to draw the line between
sophisticates and naffs, we must recognize that these regimes inevitably
imply a choice regarding the appropriate apportionment of moral
responsibility for the consequences of what we might consider "bad"
decisions. For some-the legislator who feels his obligation to respond
to an injustice can be discharged by voting for a disclosure mandate, for
exampleo-disclosure may well provide a plausible basis to justify
certain distributive choices, even to the losing end of the distribution.
Such justification may seem more plausible in the case of disclosure
than in the case of other types of distributive choices precisely because
the heterogeneity that generates the need for distributive choicesheterogeneity in cognitive capacities-is a form of difference that we
may tend to think is more within the control of moral agents than other
forms of difference such as race or gender. "If you had been more
careful, tried harder, or"-more problematically given the cost of
education-"gotten a better education, perhaps you would have avoided
the harm that has befallen you," we might say. The unspoken subtext, of
course, is: "Because you could have-indeed, should have-avoided the
harm yourself, I am not morally responsible for it."
V.

BRINGING MORAL DISCRIMINATION TO THE FORE

I should say that I do not believe proponents of mandated disclosure
themselves see this type of moral discrimination as a purpose of the
regimes they espouse-at least not consciously. Nor do I claim that
moral agents do in fact have more control over the types of capacities
that can determine whether mandated disclosures will "work" for them
than they have over other types of differences such as race or gender.
Rather, I think this feature of mandated disclosure-its potential to serve
as a moral salve and even a moral license-may well be a deep and
underappreciated foundation underlying most regulatory regimes that are
directed at human decisionmaking. As Professor Craswell notes,
disclosure mandates do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they are one of a
range of policy actions-or inactions-that might be adopted in
response to the kinds of "trouble stories" that, in Professors BenShahar's and Schneider's telling, currently tend to generate new
disclosure mandates.
50. Id. at 684 ("In short, when lawmakers are besieged, mandated disclosure looks like rescue. Its
critics are few. Lawmakers can be seen to have acted.") (footnote omitted).
51. Craswell, supranote 2, at 372-79.
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Whenever we adopt a regulatory tool with the hope of influencing
individual decisionmaking-be it a disclosure mandate, or an alternative
such as a "nudge" or a change in architecture -we are inevitably
engaging in a distributive exercise across individuals who are
heterogeneous not just in their preferences, nor even in their
contributions to aggregate social utility, but also in their capacities. My
claim is simply that this exercise necessarily entails judgments about the
relationship between capacities and moral desert, and that those
judgments are antecedent to any analysis of the costs and benefits of the
regime. Whatever regime we adopt, we are acknowledging and
accepting that some naffs will still suffer as a result of decisions they
make when interacting with sophisticates. Even where we purport to
justify this result on a comparison of costs and benefits, we must
necessarily do so by ascribing some values to those costs and benefits
that those whose interests will be affected might legitimately disagree
with. When we do so, we necessarily reject those alternative valuations.
It seems to me that the only basis for rejecting these alternative
valuations is that we believe those proffering them are attempting to
shift costs onto others that they ought to bear themselves. But where
those "costs" are the consequences of the distribution of cognitive
capacities, a claim grounded in welfarism that those on the losing end of
the distribution ought to bear the costs is meaningfully different from the
classic cheapest-cost-avoider analysis 54 that asks whether, say, a railroad
company or a farmer ought to bear the risk of an accidental fire. 5 The
claim does not rest on a comparison of any social utility deliberately
produced, consumed, or foregone by the subjects of the legal regime.
Rather, it reduces to the proposition that those who end up on the wrong
side of the divide between naffs and sophisticates are more responsible
for the consequences of their nalvet6 than the designers and the other
subjects of the regime that drew the line in the first place. This is, to put
it mildly, an audacious and highly contestable claim in any context. Yet
it is precisely such a claim that is inherent in any legal or regulatory
regime that aims to influence human decisionmaking against a

52. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).

53. On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict,Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law
and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 2098, 2123-24 (2008).
54. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 135 (1970).

55. See generally Leroy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 352-54
(1914) (Holmes, J., concurring in part); R. H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1,
28-34 (1960).
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background of heterogeneous capacities.
My co-panelists for this symposium offer helpful illustrations of this
principle. In the entertainment context Professor Said discusses, we
might argue about how to value sophisticates' enjoyment of an
uninterrupted, immersive entertainment experience against the effects of
sponsorship disclosures on those naffs who might benefit from them.
But it would be foolish for us to expect the two groups affected by our
legal regime to agree on how to do so. Instead, resolution of the question
is likely to turn on normative judgments about the appropriateness of
sophisticates enjoying an aesthetic experience at the expense of naffs
who run out to buy the latest sponsoring product without understanding
how they have been influenced. To take the extreme case, an outright
ban of tobacco product placements in entertainment products that might
be consumed by minors may strike us as a superior alternative to
disclosure of those placements, but I doubt the primary reason for that
judgment rests on cost-benefit analysis. Or to the extent it does, it can
only do so because we weigh the costs to a particular set of naffschildren-particularly heavily due to our assumptions about their
responsibility for the choices they make in response to marketing
embedded in entertainment.
In the online context Professors Hartzog and Stutzman discuss,5 we
might similarly argue about how to value the costs of designing and
imposing alternative regimes grounded in technological and architectural
features rather than regulation,5 8 and how to quantify the relative
benefits to internet users of privacy regimes as opposed to obscurity
regimes.59 But is the outcome of these exercises is extremely likely to
turn on normative judgments about what circumstances justify
subjecting the user of such networks to the consequences of their
oversharing. This may have less to do with the costs of prophylactic
architecture or disclosure than with other circumstances that are morally
relevant to allocation of costs-for example, whether we think it is right
that a human being be defined for the rest of their lives by the least
prudent thing they ever did as a teenager in possession of a camera
phone.
I use the emotionally charged example of minors in these two
scenarios to drive home the point: the distributive, and hence, moral
56. Zahr K. Said, Mandated Disclosure in Literary Hybrid Speech, 88 WASH. L. REV 421, 45866 (2013).
57. Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 385 (2013).
58. Id. at 402-18.
59. Id. at 390-402.
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implications of heterogeneous capacities loom large in all contexts, for
all disclosure regimes and for all possible policy alternatives. I would
encourage us to take them as the startingpoint in our regulatory design
rather than obscure them in the footnotes of a cost-benefit calculation
that can only be performed after making far more difficult normative
commitments.
CONCLUSION
Moral comparisons among the subjects of a legal regime are inherent
in any cost-benefit analysis that evaluates the effects of the regime on a
population with heterogeneous cognitive capacities. Drawing such
comparative judgments and imposing their inevitable distributive
consequences is bound to be an uncomfortable task for a policymaker in
a pluralist society with liberal democratic ideals-it evokes all the
60
destabilizing power struggles of Cicero's optimates and populares;
of
Nietzsche's masters and slaves.61 But the discomfort of facing these
distributive choices is no excuse for pretending we are not making them.
If we think that disclosure mandates are failures, it must be not only
because they are costly but also because those who do benefit from the
disclosures ought not benefit at the expense of others who will bear the
cost. Conversely, if we conclude they are successful, it will only be
because we think the naffs who benefit ought to be protected at the
expense of others. These normative dimensions of policy design will
present themselves in any legal regime that purports to influence human
decisionmaking against a backdrop of heterogeneous capacities-which
is to say, nearly every legal regime. As we continue to learn more about
the nature and limits of our own decisionmaking capacities, we will have
to become more comfortable answering the types of normative questions
this type of policy-making forces on us.

60. CICERO: SPEECH ON BEHALF OF PUBLIUS SESTIUS 32 (Robert A. Kaster trans., 2006).
61. See generally FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (Keith Ansell-

Pearson ed., Carol Diethe trans., Cambridge University Press 1994).

